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In this paper, we address how targeting and consumer multi-homing impact plat-
form competition and market equilibria in two-sided markets. We analyze platforms
that are financed by both advertising and subscription fees, and let them adopt a
targeting technology with increasing performance in audience size: a larger audience
generates more consumer data, which improves the platforms’ targeting ability and al-
lows them to extract more ad revenues. Targeting therefore increases the importance
of attracting consumers. Previous literature has shown that this could result in fierce
price competition if consumers subscribe to only one platform (i.e. single-home).
Surprisingly, we find that pure single-homing possibly does not constitute a Nash
equilibrium. Instead, platforms might rationally set prices that induce consumers to
subscribe to more than one platform (i.e. multi-home). With multi-homing, a plat-
form’s audience size is not restricted by the number of subscribers on rival platforms.
Hence, multi-homing softens the competition over consumers. We show that this
might imply that equilibrium profit is higher with than without targeting, in sharp
contrast to what previous literature predicts.
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1 Introduction
Media platforms compete for consumer attention. While some consumers are devoted to
a single media provider, others spread their attention across multiple platforms.2 The
emergence of digital technologies has facilitated the latter, which we refer to as consumer
multi-homing. All it takes to read an additional newspaper online, is a few extra clicks. In
contrast, to access more print news, one has to go out and buy another newspaper.3
For ad-financed platforms, the distinction between exclusive (single-homing) and shared
(multi-homing) consumers is utterly important. Having exclusive access to certain con-
sumers implies that advertisers cannot reach them elsewhere, allowing the platforms to
price their ad space accordingly. Consumers that are shared with other platforms, on the
other hand, are typically worth less in the ad market. Since the advertisers can reach
these consumers on other platforms as well, the platforms can only charge advertisers the
incremental value of an additional impression. This is known as the incremental pricing
principle (see e.g., Ambrus et al., 2016; Athey et al., 2018 and Anderson et al., 2018).
In the digital era, platforms increasingly adopt advanced advertising technologies such
as targeting. This can help identify the consumers that are most likely to buy the adver-
tisers’ product and make sure that impressions are directed towards the most promising
candidates. Our model incorporates a targeting technology with increasing returns to scale
in the audience size. One could, for instance, think of a machine-learning algorithm that
improves as it is exposed to more consumer data. Platforms that collect more user data
could therefore be better able to connect advertisers with the target audience. The upshot
is that advertisers might be willing to pay more per impression on platforms with a large
audience and higher targeting ability.4
Previous studies have shown that targeting might increase competition and benefit
consumers through lower subscription prices (see e.g. Kox et al., 2017; Crampes et al.,
2009).5 Moreover, the studies emphasize that the additional revenues from the ad side of
2This has caught the attention of a number of researchers, such as Ambrus et al. (2016), Athey et al.
(2018), Anderson et al. (2017; 2018; 2019).
3Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and Affeldt et al. (2019) argue why digital technologies make multi-
homing more compelling.
4Goettler (2012) studies broadcast networks and provides empirical evidence that the ad price per
viewer might increase in audience size.
5Kox et al. (2017) explicitly examine targeting, while Crampes et al. (2009) consider a more general
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the market tend to get competed away on the consumer side of the market, leaving the
platforms worse off. Kox et al. (2017) also point out that even though it would be in
the platforms’ common interest not to target ads, each platform might have individual
incentives to do so. These findings are, however, based on the assumption that consumers
single-home (join a single platform). Despite the relevance to modern media markets, the
literature that combines consumer multi-homing and targeting is scarce. The purpose of
this paper is to enrich the theoretical understanding of this phenomenon.
We scrutinize the outcomes under both single-homing and multi-homing, and investigate
whether they constitute Nash equilibria. In line with existing literature, we find that
targeting generates a prisoner’s dilemma situation under the assumption of single-homing.
But remarkably, we find that platforms may not want to set subscription prices that makes
consumers prefer single-homing. Indeed, setting prices that incentivize consumers to multi-
home could be a unique equilibrium. Combining elements from Crampes et al. (2009),
Ambrus et al. (2016) and Anderson et al. (2017), we show that things turn out quite
differently if consumers multi-home. In the absence of targeting, consumer multi-homing
makes subscription prices strategically independent: if one platform changes its price, this
has no impact on rival platforms’ optimal price setting. To put it more concretely: suppose
that you are going to purchase The Washington Post and consider to buy a copy of The
New York Times (NYT) as well. When deciding whether to purchase NYT as an additional
newspaper, what matters is the price of NYT (and not The Post).
This does not change if we introduce targeting. However, in that case, the platforms
must take into account that the price setting of rival platforms will affect the profitability
of targeting. If we revert to our previous example: By reducing its subscription price, The
NYT could improve its targeting ability and charge advertisers extra. Since advertisers
are not willing to pay the full extra for shared consumers (recall the incremental pricing
principle), this would be more attractive the larger the number of exclusive consumers.
A price reduction by The Post would, however, increase the number of consumers that
buy The Post in addition to NYT. The NYT’s gain from increased targeting ability would
therefore be counteracted by a greater fraction of shared consumers. Hence, targeting
has surprising consequences. In contrast to what is usually observed, subscription prices
become strategic substitutes: it is less profitable for a platform to reduce its subscription
advertising technology.
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price if rival platforms do the same.
Although targeting still makes it optimal to reduce subscription prices when consumers
multi-home, it does not trigger an aggressive response from rival platforms. As a result,
it is more imperative to implement targeting. Yet, softer competition alone cannot ensure
that targeting is profitable. We show that this can only be guaranteed if multi-homing
consumers are sufficiently valuable to advertisers.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review related literature. In
sections 3 and 4, we present a basic model and introduce a targeting technology. In section
5, we compare our results to disclose when targeting is profitable, and in section 6, we
investigate potential equilibria. We conclude in section 7.
2 Related literature
This paper draws on two strands of media literature that are not usually brought together.
One strand investigates the importance of consumer multi-homing, and the other examines
the impact of targeted advertising.
Athey and Gans (2010) and Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) were among the first to
address the impact of targeting on media platform competition. The former paper considers
competition between a local platform that is tailored to the local audience (which is the
local advertiser’s intended audience) and a general platform that depends on targeting
technologies to identify the advertiser’s relevant consumer base. Targeting helps the general
platform allocate constrained ad space more efficiently and allows it to accommodate a
larger number of advertisers.
Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) model competition between online and offline media
under the assumption that online media has higher targeting ability. Absent targeting,
each advertiser places ads on several platforms to ensure that it reaches enough consumers.
In this model, consumers’ interests are correlated with their presence on a specific platform.
Increased targeting ability thus allows advertisers to concentrate on just the most relevant
platforms, reducing the overall demand for ads.
More recently, Gong et al. (2019) propose a different approach in which competition for
consumers plays a prominent role. In their model, differences in the platforms’ ability to
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target ads are exogenously given.6 Assuming that consumers dislike irrelevant ads, Gong
et al. suggest that improved targeting reduces the consumers’ nuisance costs. At the same
time, greater targeting ability attracts more advertisers. Hence, platforms with superior
targeting abilities attract more consumers and advertisers, and they are more profitable.
A common feature of these papers is that platform differences are exogenously given.
This gives rise to significant effects on the supply and demand of ads, which would be less
prominent in a model with symmetric platforms (like ours). We disregard the allocative
effects, and allow targeting ability to be determined within the model: by reducing its
subscription price, a platform can increase its audience size and improve its targeting ability.
Since none of the mentioned papers regards subscription fees, a similar interplay between
the two sides of the market does not occur in these papers. This is one explanation of
why we arrive at quite different results. Another reason is that we use a different targeting
technology. As demonstrated by Crampes et al. (2009), the nature of the advertising
technology is decisive for platform behavior and market outcomes.
Regarding the targeting specification, we find the contribution by Hagiu and Wright
(2020) interesting. The paper pays attention to how technologies may improve based on
learning from consumer data. This insight is useful for the understanding of how learning-
based targeting technologies function. A general form of our targeting specification can
be recognized in Crampes et al. (2009), who model the impact of advertising technologies
with constant, decreasing and increasing returns to scale in the audience size, and point
at the limitation of assuming linearity. Although the authors do not accentuate increasing
returns to scale, we argue that the current focus on first-party data and technology makes
this particular specification highly relevant. We therefore use a variant of this technology
in our set-up. Like most previous research on targeting and media platform competition,
Crampes et al. (2009) assume consumer single-homing. We relax this assumption, and
show that this provides entirely different outcomes.
The use of consumer data to target ads has raised privacy concerns. Johnson (2013)
stresses that targeting might be harmful when consumers value privacy. He investigates
the impact of targeting when consumers have access to ad-avoidance tools, and shows that
consumers tend to block too few ads in equilibrium. Kox et al. (2017) incorporate privacy
6In an extension, Gong et al. (2019) allow the platforms to invest in targeting ability, and show that
under-investment is most likely to occur.
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considerations in a work that is closer to ours. In a similar framework, the authors show
that targeting reduces consumer welfare if the disutility of sharing personal information
is greater than the advantage of lower subscription prices. Recall from the Introduction
that Kox et al. also find that platform profits decrease in targeting. As a result, their
model suggests that stricter privacy regulations benefit both consumers and platforms. An
important difference between Kox et al. (2017) and this paper is that the former assumes
a linear advertising technology and consumer single-homing.
This paper adds to the growing literature that covers consumer multi-homing. A key
take away from existing research is the incremental pricing principle that we describe in
the Introduction. Ambrus et al. (2016) emphasize that an implication of advertisers’ lower
valuation of shared consumers is that it is not only the overall demand that counts; the
composition of the demand also matters. When advertisers place ads on platforms with
multi-homing consumers, there is a risk that some consumers have seen the ad before. As
pointed out by Athey et al. (2018), impressing the same consumer twice is less efficient
than impressing two different consumers. We combine this insight of ad-financed platform
markets with elements from the user-financed platform market in Anderson et al. (2017)
to derive a two-sided model with dual source financing.
Although various papers assess different aspects of consumer multi-homing, the litera-
ture that integrates multi-homing with targeted advertising is scarce. There are, however,
a few exceptions. Taylor (2012) investigates how targeting affects platforms’ incentives to
improve content in order to increase their share of consumer attention. The paper focuses
on how the platforms can retain consumer attention. In contrast, we disregard the atten-
tion span of the audience and rather focus on its size. Another exception is D’Annunzio
and Russo (2020), who study the role of ad networks and how tracking technologies af-
fect market outcomes. However, since they focus on a different part of the industry (ad
networks), they address other and complementary questions.
3 The model
We consider two media platforms that offer subscriptions to consumers and advertising
space (eyeballs) to advertisers. We employ a simple Hotelling (1929) model, with a line
of length one, and assign one platform to each endpoint, i.e., platform 1 is located at
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x1 = 0 and platform 2 is located at x2 = 1. Along the line, there is a unit mass of
uniformly distributed consumers. The distribution represents the consumers’ taste: the
greater distance to a platform, the greater mismatch between the consumer preferences
and the platform characteristics.
We consider two different regimes (which we later analyze whether constitute Nash
equilibria). One of them is a pure single-homing regime (hereafter referred to as the single-
homing regime) where all consumers subscribe to only one platform. The other is a multi-
homing regime where some (but not all) consumers use more than one platform.7 The
outcomes for both regimes are presented.
3.1 Consumer demand
Single-homing consumers join only the platform they prefer the most. Let ui represent the
utility a consumer located at x obtains from subscribing to platform i = 1, 2:
ui = v − t|x− xi| − pi. (1)
The parameter v > 0 is the intrinsic utility of joining a platform, t > 0 represents the
disutility of the mismatch between the consumer’s preferences and the platform’s charac-
teristics, and pi is the subscription price.
The consumer that is indifferent between only subscribing to platform 1 and only sub-
scribing to platform 2 is located at x̃, where u1 = u2. Consumers to the left of x̃ subscribe
to platform 1 and consumers to the right subscribe to platform 2. Hence, the demand








We do, however, allow consumers to subscribe to both platforms. The utility from dual
subscription equals the sum of the individual utilities:
u1+2 = 2v − t− p1 − p2. (3)
If the incremental utility of multi-homing is positive for some consumers, u1+2(x) ≥
ui(x), those consumers will subscribe to both platforms. Hence, each platform potentially
7With complete multi-homing, targeting would neither affect demand nor subscription prices. In this
case, the analysis simply boils down to the change in ad prices.
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serves two groups of consumers: exclusive subscribers and subscribers who are shared with
the rival platform.
Let x12 represent the location of the consumer who is indifferent between subscribing
to just platform 1 and subscribing to both platform 1 and platform 2.8 Since platform 2
does not provide any additional utility to the indifferent consumer, u1+2 = u1. Platform
1’s exclusive demand then arises from the consumers who are located to the left of x12. It
follows that the platforms’ shared demand is made up by the consumers located between
x12 and x21. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Demand platform i = 1, 2.
We solve u1+2 = u1 and u1+2 = u2 and find x12 =
1
t
(−v + t+ p2) and x21 = 1t (v − p1),
respectively. With symmetric platforms, we get that platform i’s exclusive demand is given
by
xei =
−v + t+ pj
t
, (4)
whereas its shared demand equals
xshi =
2v − t− pi − pj
t
. (5)









Equation (6) tells us that total demand for platform i is independent of the rival plat-
form’s subscription price (pj). A change in pj will, however, affect the composition of
8Vice versa, x21 represents the location of the consumer that is indifferent between subscribing to only
platform 2 and both platform 2 and platform 1.
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platform i’s demand. From equation (4), we see that the number of exclusive subscribers
is increasing in pj, while equation (5) shows an inverse relationship between the number of
shared subscribers and pj.
3.2 Advertisers and Platforms
Turning to the advertising side,we normalize the number of advertisers to one. The demand
for ads is perfectly elastic, and we assume that each advertiser purchase space for one ad
per platform. In line with the incremental pricing principle, we assume that the advertisers
are willing to pay αi to reach an exclusive consumer, but only a fraction σαi to reach a







where superscripts k = S and k = M represent the single-homing regime and the multi-
homing regime, respectively.


















Consider first a model without targeting. In this situation, we assume that the advertiser
value of reaching a consumer is not platform dependent, such that αi = αj = α. We





















The first square bracket on the right-hand side of equation (9) deals with the consumer
side of the market, corresponding to a standard one-sided model. If we consider an increase
in pi, this implies that each consumer pays more, but it also means a lower number of
9This corresponds to Anderson et al. (2018).
10We set all costs to zero to simplify the model.
9
subscribers. In our two-sided model, the price increase has an impact on the ad side of
the market as well: platform i displays fewer ads and thereby loses ad revenues. This is
captured by the second square bracket. Because of the negative effect a price increase has
on ad revenues, the optimal subscription price is lower in a two-sided model.




and pSi (pj) =
t+ pj − α
2
. (10)
We note that in the multi-homing regime, subscription prices are strategically inde-
pendent.11 In other words, platform i’s subscription price is not responsive to changes in
platform j’s subscription price. To see why, suppose that platform j adjusts pj. From sec-
tion 3.1, we know that even though it alters the number of exclusive and shared consumers,
the price change has no effect on platform i’s total demand. This is because the location
of platform i’s marginal consumer stays the same. Keep in mind that the marginal con-
sumer is located where her incremental value of subscribing to platform i is zero. Hence,
platform i’s subscription price still extracts the marginal consumer’s incremental benefit.
Besides, platform i’s price setting does not affect the advertisers’ valuation of the marginal
consumer. Consequently, platform i has no incentive to change its subscription price in
response to an adjustment in pj. In the single-homing regime, we get the standard result
that prices are strategic complements.
Lemma 1 (No targeting) Subscription prices are
(i) strategic complements in the single-homing regime
(ii) strategically independent in the multi-homing regime
4 Introducing targeting
Next, we introduce targeting to our model. We recognize that advertisers may not only
care about the reach of ads, but also about the quality of the match with the audience.
Suppose that the platforms implement targeting technologies that enable them to create
better matches between advertisers and viewers. Moreover, the technology becomes more
11This is in line with Anderson et al. (2017).
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accurate as the platforms increase their audience size and thereby generate more data.12
We assume that advertisers are willing to pay for improvements in the platforms’ targeting
ability, and formulate the ad price as follows:
αki = α(1 + ϕD
k
i ) (11)
where ϕ is a dummy that takes on the value one when targeting is included in the model
and zero otherwise. Notice that in the latter case, equation (11) reverts to the non-targeting
ad price (α). For ϕ equal to one, the definition implies that the ad price is increasing in the
platform’s audience size (
∂αki
∂Dki
> 0), capturing the benefit of having more consumer data
and improved targeting ability.
In the targeting model, α is interpreted as measurement of how efficiently the platforms
are using consumer data to improve their targeting ability. As we proceed, we will see how
this adjustment of the model can change the results drastically.
Inserting equation (11) into equation (8), and differentiating with respect to own price,

























When ϕ equals zero, we recognize equation (12) as the first-order condition in the model
without targeting (cf. equation (9)). The two additional terms that appear when ϕ equals
one represent the effects that emerge when we incorporate targeting. First, consider the
third term on the right hand side. It tells us that ad revenues are more sensitive to changes
in the number of ad impressions (in response to a change in the subscription price) than
without targeting.13 The explanation is that the ad price, which corresponds to the first
part of the third term (cf. equation (11)), is higher with targeting (ϕ = 1). Second, we
evaluate the fourth term. This expression captures a property that is not present in the
model without targeting, namely that a platform’s ad price responds to changes in its own
subscription price. An increase in pki causes a reduction in α
k
i , and vice versa.
12We assume that each consumer delivers one data point, such that we measure the amount of data by
the number of consumers.
13Since each consumer is impressed once, the number of subscribers is equivalent to the number of ad
impressions.
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Solving equation (12) for pki , we find the best-response functions:
pMi (pj) =
v (t+ α)− α (t+ 3vσ)− αpj (1− σ)
2(t− ασ)
and pSi (pj) =
t (t− 2α) + pj (t− α)
2t− α
. (13)
The best-response functions reveal a striking difference between the single-homing
regime and the multi-homing regime. If all consumers single-home, subscription prices
are strategic complements (dpSi /dpj > 0). In contrast, if at least some consumers multi-
home, subscription prices are strategic substitutes (dpMi /dpj < 0). This means that the
optimal response to changes in the rival platform’s subscription price depends on whether
consumers only single-home or if some of them multi-home.
We can state:
Proposition 1 (Targeting) When platforms target ads, subscription prices are
(i) strategic complements in the single-homing regime
(ii) strategic substitutes in the multi-homing regime
The first result in Proposition 1 is well known in the literature: in a single-homing
regime, the best response to a change in the rival subscription price is to adjust own price
in the same direction.
The second result in Proposition 1, however, is quite surprising. While platform i’s
best response to a change in the rival subscription price is to do nothing in the multi-
homing model without targeting (cf. Lemma 1), the best response in the targeting model
is to adjust pMi in the opposite direction. Since targeting does not change the property of
total demand being independent of the rival subscription price, the difference between the
models may not be intuitive. After all, this property implies that pMi extracts the marginal
consumer’s incremental benefit regardless of any changes in pMj . The key to understanding
why a change in pMj still induces a response, is that targeting enables platform i to affect
the advertisers’ willingness to pay. To see why, suppose that platform j increases pMj . This
creates a shift from shared to exclusive subscribers for platform i, which implies a smaller
share of discounted ad impressions. Platform i would therefore gain from increasing its ad
price. Targeting enables the platform to do so by reducing pMi and improving its targeting




5 When is targeting profitable?
In this section, we compare the outcomes with and without targeting, and reveal when tar-
geting is profitable. First, we find the symmetric non-targeting equilibrium prices. Solving




and pS = t− α. (14)
We then find the symmetric targeting equilibrium prices (the asterisk superscript de-








= t− 2α. (15)
Comparing equations (14) and (15), we observe that subscription prices are lower when
platforms target ads, irrespective of whether all consumers single-home or if some multi-
home.
Targeting provides greater incentives to attract a larger audience, and to do so, the
platforms lower their subscription prices.
We can state:
Lemma 2 Subscription prices will be lower when platforms use targeting technologies.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following, we first analyze the single-homing regime, then proceed to the multi-
homing regime.
5.1 Single-homing
We restrict our attention to markets with full coverage and endogenously non-negative
prices. This, as well as fulfillment of the stability and second-order conditions, is ensured
by Condition 1:
Condition 1 (Single-homing) 5
2
α < t < 2
3
(v + α).
It follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 that targeting leads to fiercer price compe-
tition.
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It follows that subscription revenues are lower with targeting. Even though ad revenues
are higher, they do not fully compensate for the lost subscription revenues. Inserting







(2t− α) and πS = 1
2
t. (17)
Equation (17) shows clearly that the targeting profit is lower than the non-targeting
profit and decreasing in the technology’s sensitivity to more data. The reason is that
the higher α, the greater the incentive to reduce the subscription price, which significantly
reduces subscription revenues. This raises the question of whether the platforms at all wish
to adopt targeting technologies. Although it is in the platforms’ common interest not to
target, each platform has incentives to deviate from the mutually beneficial strategy. The
platforms might therefore end up in a prisoner’s dilemma situation where all platforms
target (see also Kox et al., 2017).
We state:
Lemma 3 (Prisoner’s dilemma) When all consumers single-home, targeting is a dominant
strategy and the platforms end up in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Proof. See Appendix.
As we demonstrate in the equilibrium analysis, the platforms could, however, be better
off by setting the multi-homing price and also attract consumers who already subscribe to
the rival platform.
5.2 Multi-homing
Assume now consumer multi-homing. We consider partial multi-homing, i.e. situations
where some, but not all, consumers use both platforms. Note that t > 1
2
(v + 3σα) and
t < v+σα ensure the existence of exclusive and shared consumers, respectively. Moreover,
we confine the analysis to situations with endogenously non-negative subscription prices
14
and parameter values that satisfy all second-order and stability constraints. The conditions
are given in the Appendix.
From Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 it follows that targeting provides incentives to reduce
the subscription price, and that the rival platform will respond favorably. Moreover, the
incentive to lower the price increases with advertisers’ willingness to pay for shared con-
sumers. This is captured in our model by the σ-parameter, where ∂pM
∗
/∂σ < 0. The price
reduction contributes to greater overall demand, and the increase is reinforced by the rival






For targeting to be profitable, two conditions must therefore be satisfied: (i) Ad revenues
must increase with targeting; and (ii) the increase in ad revenues must be greater than the
loss in subscription revenues. Comparing ad revenues with and without targeting, we
find that ad revenues are greater with targeting if σ > 1
3
. However, if σ ≤ 1
3
, that is
not necessarily true. The smaller σ, the lower is the ad price the platforms can charge
for impressing shared consumers. This is particularly harmful in combination with weak
platform preferences (low t), because targeting then creates a greater shift from exclusive
consumers to shared consumers. A larger proportion of less valuable shared consumers
could, in this case, offset the advantage of an increased ad price.
Finally, whether targeting is profitable or not thus depends on σ. We find it useful to
consider σ > 1
3
and σ ≤ 1
3
separately. The exact calculations are found in the Appendix.
First, we look at the case where σ > 1
3




σ (σ + 1)
)
is
required to satisfy the multi-homing conditions. The more responsive the ad price is to
the audience size (α) and the more advertisers value shared consumers (σ), the stronger
incentives the platforms have to set lower subscription prices, and the greater must the
intrinsic utility (v) be to ensure non-negative subscription prices.
As σ goes towards 1
3




+ ε. For both vmin and σmin, we have that targeting provides greater profits:
(πM
∗ − πM)|vmin > 0 and (πM
∗ − πM)|σmin > 0.
Moreover, we have that the difference between profits with and without targeting is




|vmin > 0), and the difference is increasing




|σmin > 0). Finally, higher v-values enhance the
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increase in (πM









In sum, this means that targeting is profitable for all σ > 1
3
. We then consider σ ≤ 1
3
.
Because shared consumers have lower value in the ad market for small σ−values, the
incentives to increase the audience size are weaker, and positive subscription prices can be
achieved even for v < α. For σ ≤ 1
3
, targeting does not necessarily increase ad revenues.
Since targeting also reduces subscription revenues, it might lead to lower profits.
We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Multi-homing). Suppose that the multi-homing conditions hold. Targeting
is profitable if advertisers place a high enough value on shared consumers. A sufficient




Combining Lemma 3 and Proposition 2, gives us the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Targeting can only be profitable in the multi-homing regime
6 Equilibrium analysis
We now proceed to comparing the market outcomes with pure single-homing and multi-
homing and examining the existence of Nash equilibria. In this part, we restrict our atten-
tion to parameter values that fulfill the conditions for both the single-homing model and
the multi-homing model. From Condition 1, we have that this requires that v > 11
4
α. To
illustrate the key point, we set v = 3α, which is close to the minimum v−value. In the
Robustness section in the Appendix, we show that the results we arrive at are valid also
for v > 3α, at least if shared consumers are not virtually worthless to advertisers.
Condition 2 ensures partial multi-homing in the multi-homing regime, non-negative
prices and full market coverage in the single-homing regime, in addition to satisfying second-
order and stability conditions.








Figure 2: Equilibrium prices.
6.1 Comparison of equilibrium outcomes
Comparing the subscription prices in equation (15), we find that pS
∗ ≥ pM∗ for σ > 2
3
. For
lower σ, the single-homing price may be both greater and smaller than the multi-homing
price, as illustrated in Figure 2 (parameter values: t = 3α and α = 1).
When σ is low, the platforms have weaker incentives to reduce the multi-homing price.
However, the higher t, the greater price reduction is required to persuade consumers to
multi-home. Hence, if t is sufficiently high (the condition is given in the Appendix), the
multi-homing price could still be lower than the single-homing price. Conversely, a higher
σ (corresponding to shared consumers being more valuable) provides stronger incentives to
reduce subscription prices in the multi-homing regime. This is why we observe that pM
∗
decreases in σ, both in absolute value and relative to pS
∗
.





). Finally, we consider profits. We find that if σ ≥ 0.65, single-homing profits




). For σ < 0.65, however, profits
may or may not be greater with single-homing. A sufficiently high t can ensure that single-
homing makes the platforms better off. This is illustrated by Figure 3 (parameter values:
t = 3.3α and α = 1).14
14We use different sets of parameter values in the two figures because it enables us to demonstrate that
prices and profits can be both higher and lower with single-homing compared to multi-homing.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium profits.
From the analysis of subscription prices we know that consumers who subscribe to only
one platform are better off in a multi-homing regime when σ > 2
3
, since pS
∗ ≥ pM∗ .
Moreover, we find that at least some consumers prefer multi-homing over single-homing
if σ > 2
9
.
The following proposition sums up the comparison of equilibrium outcomes:
Proposition 3 Assume that condition 2 holds and that σ > 2
3
.
Compared to pure single-homing, multi-homing provides
(i) lower subscription prices and higher consumer utility
(ii) higher ad revenues
(iii) higher platform profits
Proof. See Appendix.
By nature, single-homing profits do not depend on the value of shared consumers (σ).
Multi-homing profits, on the other hand, are either increasing in σ or have a U-shaped
relationship with σ. An increase in σ means that shared consumers are more valuable
to advertisers. Since this allows the platforms to charge a higher ad price, one might
expect that it would lead to greater platform profits. For most parameter values, profits
are indeed unambiguously increasing in σ. An increase in the value of shared consumers
also makes the platforms eager to attract more of them. But suppose that consumers have
very strong platform preferences (high t). Attracting a larger audience may then require
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a price drop that is more costly than the additional revenue from gained consumers. This
could be the case if the value of shared consumers, even after an increase, remains fairly
low. Consequently, the overall impact on profits could be negative. However, as σ takes on
higher values, profits will eventually start to increase. Figure 3 illustrates this U-shaped
relationship between σ and multi-homing profits.
6.2 The existence of equilibria
Next, we investigate whether single-homing and multi-homing constitute potential equilib-
ria. If shared consumers are sufficiently valuable, it pays off to charge lower subscription
fees and forgo some subscription revenues in order to extract more ad-side revenues. More-
over, if the platforms set multi-homing prices, some consumers will actually subscribe to
both platforms.
If, on the other hand, the advertiser valuation of shared consumers is low (small sigma),
multi-homing might not constitute an equilibrium. In a situation with weak platform
preferences (low t), a reduction in the subscription price would be efficient in attracting
many consumers, making it tempting to undercut the rival’s subscription price and only
serve more valuable exclusive consumers. Both platforms would in that case deviate from
multi-homing. However, as long as σ > σ∗ = 0.03, we find that it is never beneficial for a
platform to deviate from multi-homing. Recall that σ ∈ (0, 1), which means that there is
only a small interval where deviation from multi-homing might be feasible.
Then, consider the single-homing regime. Unless shared consumers have very little
value for advertisers, the platforms have strong incentives to deviate from setting the single-
homing price. More precisely, we find that it is profitable for a platform to deviate from
single-homing for all σ > 0.1.
The most obvious reason is that deviation enables the platforms to sell more subscrip-
tions and ad impressions. But even if shared consumers are not that valuable (i.e. σ < 0.1),
single-homing does not constitute an equilibrium.
The single-homing prices would still be so low that some consumers would like to deviate
and subscribe to both platforms.
We can state:
Proposition 4 Assume that condition 2 holds. Then, there exists
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(i) a unique equilibrium with multi-homing for σ > σ∗
(ii) no equilibrium with single-homing for all σ > 0
Remark 1 Multi-homing could also constitute an equilibrium for σ < σ∗, but only if con-
sumers have sufficiently strong platform preferences.
Proof. See Appendix.
The second result of Proposition 4 is particularly interesting. Previous literature has
typically made the stark assumption of single-homing, which we find never takes part in a
targeting equilibrium, and hence might not be an appropriate assumption to make.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has two major contributions: First, we demonstrate the importance of consumer
multi-homing. Multi-homing allows the platforms to attract more subscribers, which is
increasingly valuable in the ad market when platforms use targeting technologies with
increasing returns to scale in the audience size. Moreover, targeting does not trigger an
aggressive price response from the rival platform, as would be the case in a single-homing
regime. Altogether, we find that targeting can only be profitable if we relax the typically
made single-homing assumption.
The second key contribution is an even more important one: we find that pure single-
homing never occurs in equilibrium. This means that existing literature assuming single-
homing might be misleading, and emphasizes that assessing the nature of consumer pur-
chasing behavior (ie. single-homing or multi-homing) is vital to fully understand the impact
of targeting.
Our set-up is partly motivated by the rise of first-party data. Until recently, consumer
data could easily be purchased from third parties. However, increased demand for pri-
vacy has led to new regulations, such as the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR).
Since GDPR came into force in 2018, compliance has been high on the business agenda,
limiting the utilization of externally collected consumer information. Web browsers in-
creasingly block third-party cookies, and platforms are moving away from third-party data
and towards permission-based, internally collected first-party data.15
15See e.g. Goswami, S. (2020, November 9) and Walter, G. (2021, January 13).
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The industry is already adapting to the new privacy-oriented landscape. Major plat-
forms like The New York Times and The Washington Post have recently developed in-house
solutions in order to control data and targeting.16 The VP of commercial technology and
development at The Washington Post, Jarrod Dicker, says (Washington Post Press release,
July 16, 2019): “User privacy is paramount to us, so we are deeply invested in building
sophisticated tools powered by first-party data”. The machine learning-based tools enable
the newspaper to benefit from data on how the users engage with the platform, and reduce
its reliance on cookie-driven information. The head of ad product for RED, Jeff Turner,
elaborates (Washington Post Press release, July 16, 2019): “Data points like a user’s cur-
rent page view and session on The Post’s site are much more relevant to that user’s current
consumption intention than the information a cookie-driven strategy can offer”. Advertis-
ers cannot find this insight elsewhere, which gives the platforms a competitive advantage.
The focus on privacy has increased the strategic importance of first-party data, which is
also the key to successful targeting in our model.
Our model makes the assumption of ad-neutral consumers. Targeting could, however,
either increase or reduce ad nuisance. On the one hand, privacy concerns might lead to less
consumer satisfaction (Johnson, 2013; Kox et al., 2017). On the other hand, more relevant
ads could please them (Gong et al., 2019). The overall effect is therefore ambiguous. We
leave this analysis for future research. Our model specification says that the platforms’
targeting ability increases at a constant rate as more consumers subscribe. While some
sources claim that the more data, the better targeting results, others suggest that the
benefit of more data will be diminishing at some point. We have not formally analyzed
this issue, but we do not believe that it would change the key properties. Targeting would
presumably still provide similar, but somewhat smaller effects.
We assume that advertisers’ willingness to pay to reach a shared consumer is weakly
lower than their willingness to pay to reach an exclusive consumer, i.e. σ ∈ (0, 1). In an
empirical study of US magazines, Shi (2016) finds that shared consumers are about half as
valuable as exclusive consumers, i.e. σ = 1
2
. This estimate indicates that it is reasonable
to assume that platforms must charge less for consumers that can be reached elsewhere.
One may also ask whether stricter privacy regulations provide greater incentives to
cooperate in order to share data. On the one hand, joining forces to increase the total data
16See Fischer, S. (2020, May 19).
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pool could be seen as an alternative to purchasing third-party data. On the other hand,
stricter regulations might make cooperation less feasible. Furthermore, the perhaps greatest
advantage of first-party data is that it provides the platforms with exclusive insight. This
advantage clearly goes against sharing. Future studies could explore this issue further.
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Appendix
A.1 Conditions for multi-homing
Without targeting, second-order and stability conditions are always satisfied. From the
equilibrium price, which is given by pM = v−σα
2
, we see that v > σα is required for the




2t− v − ασ
t
; xsh =








The restriction of the analysis to partial multi-homing implies that we need xe > 0 and
xsh > 0. This places some additional constraints on the parameter values: 1
2
(v+σα) < t <
v + σα.
With targeting, stability requires t > 1
2
α (σ + 1) and the second-order condition is
satisfied for t > σα. The equilibrium price is given by equation (15), and non-negative
prices require that t > αv(3σ−1)

















for which partial multi-homing is ensured by 1
2
(v + 3ασ) < t < v + 1
2
α(1 + 3σ).
Summarizing, this leaves us with the two binding constraints, depending on the value
of σ:
Condition A.1 (Multi-homing) max{1
2
(v + 3σα),αv(3σ−1)








α(1 + σ)} < t < v + σα for σ ≤ 1
3
.








Proof of Lemma 2
Under single-homing, this follows directly as pS
∗ − pS = t− 2α− (t−α) = −α < 0. Under
multi-homing, we have pM
∗ − pM = 1
2
α
2t+α(1−3σ)(v − 2t(1 + σ) − 3vσ + ασ − 3ασ
2), which
is negative if conditions A.1 and A.2 hold. 
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Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the single-homing regime. Suppose platform i targets ads, while platform j does
not. The best-response functions are then
pi(pj) =
t (t− 2α) + pj (t− α)
2t− α
and pj(pi) =
t+ pi − α
2
.
The equilibrium prices are given by (superscript ‘d’ for deviation)
pdi =
3t2 − 6αt+ α2
3t− α
and pj =

















From equation (17), we have the symmetric equilibrium profits when both platforms
target and when none of the platforms targets.
































Table A.1: Prisoner’s dilemma.











(α−3t)2 > 0, which is always the case.










(3t−α)2 > 0, which is also always the case.
Hence, platform i’s dominant strategy is to target, regardless of the rival’s decision, and
despite targeting yielding lower profits than not targeting. This means that the platforms
end up in a prisoner’s dilemma when consumers single-home. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, we start by decomposing profits into ad revenues and subscription
revenues.





∗ − pMDM = −1
4
α2 (2t− v − σα− 2tσ + 3vσ + 3ασ2) 2t−v+ασ+2tσ+3vσ−3ασ2
t(α+2t−3ασ)2 < 0.








We find it useful to consider σ > 1
3
and σ < 1
3
separately.
For σ > 1
3
, we have that vmin ensures higher profits with targeting:
AM
∗ − AM |v=α = α2t
(4t2α(2σ+1)(1−σ)+4tα2(σ−2σ2+6σ3−1)−α3(σ+1)(2σ−1)(3σ−1)2)
(2t+α−3ασ)2 > 0.
















> AM for all σ > 1
3
.
We then consider σ ≤ 1
3
. If t is low, a reduction in the subscription price will turn
many exclusive consumers into shared consumers. But if the shared consumers are not
worth much in the ad market, the benefit for the platform is limited. This implies that
even though targeting increases the ad price, it does not necessarily increase ad revenues
when σ < 1
3
. We illustrate with an example:
Suppose that σ = 0, which yields
AM
∗ − AM = α(2t− v) (2tv − α
2)
2t (2t+ α)2
The expression is positive if 2tv > α2. If t and v are not sufficiently high relative to α,
this is not the case. Consider, for instance, v = 0.6, t = 0.55 and α = 1. The numerator
(2t− v) (2tv − α2) then equals −0.17, which implies that AM∗ − AM < 0.
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Platform profits We then analyze the platform profits. By inserting equations (15) and





(t− ασ)(α + v)2
(α(1− 3σ) + 2t)2
+
α(2t− v)












(v2 + 2vα(2σ − 1) + 3α2σ2 − 2α2σ − 4tα(1− σ)). (A.2)
Whether higher ad revenues compensate for lower subscription revenues is dependent
on σ. We start by considering σ > 1
3




+ ε. Evaluating multi-homing profits of equation (A.1) and (A.2) at
vmin and σmin, we have that targeting in both cases provides greater profits (π
M∗ > πM):
πM










4tv − (v + α)2
)
> 0.
Moreover, for vmin we have that (π












|σmin = 16t2α (2t− v − α) > 0.















The numerator is increasing in v, and since it is positive for vmin it is also positive for
larger v−values. In sum, targeting is profitable if σ > 1
3
.
Consider then the case where σ < 1
3
. In this case, targeting does not necessarily
increase ad revenues. Since targeting also reduces subscription revenues, it might lead to
lower profits. 
27
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of three parts:
(i) a) Subscription prices: The subscription prices are given in equation (15). The
difference in the prices, pS
∗ − pM∗ = 15α2σ−5αt−5α2+2t2−3αtσ









α2(9σ2 − 90σ + 65) + 3ασ + 5α
)
.
b) Consumer utility: To show that consumer utility is higher with multi-homing, we
need to compare the utility from subscribing to one platform with that of subscribing to two
platforms. The utility from subscribing to one platform only is up=p
S∗
i (x = 1/2) = 5α− 32t,
whereas the utility from subscribing to both platforms is given by up=p
M∗
i+j (x = 1/2) =
t7α−2t+3ασ








30α2σ − 3αt− 10α2 + 2t2 − 3αtσ
α + 2t+ 3ασ
> 0,
which holds for σ > 2
9
. From the analysis of subscription prices, we know that consumers
who subscribe to only one platform are also better off when σ > 2
3
. Hence, a sufficient
condition for all consumers to be better off with multi-homing is that σ > 2
3
.












The difference in ad prices αS
∗ − αM∗ = −1
2
α (7α−2t+3ασ)
2t+α−3ασ < 0, which states that the ad
price is always higher with multi-homing.
(iii) Profits: The platform profits are given by equations (A.1) and (A.2). The
difference is given by
πS
∗ − πM∗ = (36α
3σ3−3α2σ2(7α+10t)+2ασ(16αt+17α2−4t2)+4t2(2t−3α)−α2(50t−11α))
4(α+2t−3ασ)2 .
We find that single-homing profits cannot be greater than multi-homing profits if σ ≥
0.65 when Condition 2 holds.

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Proof of Proposition 4
A stable equilibrium is one in which no player will deviate from a given strategy. We first
examine the incentives to deviate from a multi-homing price setting, and then the incentives
to deviate from a pure single-homing outcome. Finally, we find that the consumers facing
single-homing prices will always deviate and subscribe to an additional platform, such that
single-homing can never be part of an equilibrium.
(i) Deviation from multi-homing
Suppose that platform i believes that the rival prices according to the multi-homing regime:
pj =
v(t+α)−α(t+3vσ)
2t+α(1−3σ) . Could it be optimal for platform i to charge a higher price and only
sell to consumers that do not subscribe to platform j?
We insert pj =
v(t+α)−α(t+3vσ)












2t2 + 3αt+ 3α2 − 3ασ (3α + t)− pi (α + 2t− 3ασ)
t (α + 2t− 3ασ)
and subscription price (superscript ‘d’ for deviation):
pdi =
(2t− 3α) (αt+ α2 + t2)− 3ασ (t2 + αt− 3α2)
(2t− α) (α + 2t)− 3ασ (2t− α)
.
Compared to the equilibrium price with multi-homing, the deviation price is always
higher if σ > 2
3




(12α2σ − 5αt− 4α2 − 2t2 + 3αtσ)2
(2t− α) (−α− 2t+ 3ασ)2
.







The above shows that deviation is never profitable if σ > 0.03.
However, for multi-homing to be an equilibrium, it must be true that consumers will
























α + 2t− 3ασ
,








α+2t−3ασ > 0 whenever Condition 2 holds, which confirms
that some consumers want to multi-home. Hence, (some) multi-homing consumers have
no incentives to deviate (subscribe to only one platform) when facing multi-homing prices,
and there is a unique equilibrium with multi-homing. 
(ii) Deviation from single-homing
If both platforms price according to single-homing, prices and profits are given by pS
∗
=
t − 2α and πS∗ = 1
4
(2t− α). Suppose that platform i believes that platform j sets the
single-homing price, pS
∗
. If platform i deviates and sets the prices that maximize profits if
also selling to some consumers who buy the rival’s product, we get:
pdi =
αt (σ + 1)− α2 (11σ − 5)
2(t− ασ)
.













−2t4 + 25α4 (σ − 1)2 − 10α3t (1− σ) (5− 3σ) + α2t2 (σ + 9σ2 + 5) + 3αt3 (3− 2σ)
t2 (t− ασ)
.
Examining the above equations shows that deviation is profitable when σ > 0.1. For
t−values in the higher end of Condition 2, it might also be the case for σ < 0.1.
Suppose next that for some σ < 0.1, it is optimal for the platforms to set the single-
homing price. This can only be an equilibrium if the consumers do not subscribe to both
platforms at this price. We insert pS
∗



















) = 10α− 3t.





i , which implies that there exist consumers who want to
subscribe to both platforms when p = pS
∗
. By the same token, deviation is only possible
if some consumers actually subscribe to both platforms at the deviation price. We insert
pS
∗



















3αt (σ + 5)− 5α2 (σ + 1)− 4t2
t− ασ
.







i , and there exist consumers who want to multi-home. Some
consumers have incentives to deviate and subscribe to more platforms when facing single-
homing prices. Therefore, single-homing can never take part in an equilibrium. 
A.3 Robustness
In the equilibrium analysis, we assume that v = 3α. This provides us with a more tractable
set of constraints. The drawback is that it might bring the robustness of the findings into
question. To shed some light on this issue, we take a closer look at how the results depend
on v.
First, note that πS
∗
does not depend on v, while ∂πM
∗
/∂v > 0 if v > µ ≡ α
2(1−2σ+3σ2)−2αtσ
2(t−ασ) .
Since ∂µ/∂t < 0, the requirement is strictest for tmin . From the conditions, we know that
the lowest possible t is given by 5
2
α. This gives µ|t=2α = α 7σ−3σ
2−1
2σ−5 , which is at its highest
when σ = 0 and yields µ = 1
5
α. Hence, multi-homing becomes relatively more profitable




We then consider how v affects the platforms’ incentives to deviate from committing
to single-homing and multi-homing. Suppose that we do not fix v. If the rival commits to











> 0 if v > λ ≡ α
2t(σ−1)(3σ−4)−2α3(σ−1)2−αt2σ
(t−α+ασ)2 . This is ensured
by condition (t < v + σα) for all σ > 0.01.
Proof:
v > t− σα > λ if t− σα− λ > 0. We have that:
t− σα− λ = t
3 + α3 (2− σ) (σ − 1)2 + tα2 (4σ − 3) (1− σ)− 2t2α (1− σ)
(t− α + ασ)2
The expression is greater than 0 for all σ > 0.01. 
Unless multi-homing consumers are almost worthless in the ad market, it is certainly
more tempting to deviate from single-homing if v increases from 3α.





(2tα + vα + α2 − 3α2σ + tv + 2t2 − 3tασ − 3vασ)2
(2t− α) (2t+ α− 3ασ)2






v > µ ≡ 2t
3 − α3 (3σ + 1) (1− σ)− t2α (17σ − 4) + tα2 (7− 16σ + 21σ2)
(t− α + ασ) (7t+ α− 9ασ)
.
This is ensured by condition (t < v + σα) for all σ > 0.026̇.
Proof:
v > t− σα > µ if t− σα− µ > 0. We have that
t− σα− µ = 5t
3 + α3 (1− σ) (4σ − 9σ2 + 1)− 4tα2(2− 8σ + 7σ2) + 2t2α (4σ − 5)
(t− α + ασ) (7t+ α− 9ασ)
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is positive for σ > 0.026. 
Deviation is less tempting if v increases from 3α, at least if σ ≥ 0.026̇.
Suppose that σ = 0, which yields µmax =
1
(t−α)(7t+α) (2t
3 + 4t2α + 7tα2 − α3) since
dµ
dσ
< 0. For t ≡ t′ ≤ 6.57α, we find that v ≥ 3α ≥ µ.
dµmax
dt′
> 0. We have that v > t′ (condition (t < v+σα)). This implies that if t′ > µmax ,
then v > µmax. Since
t′ − µmax =
α3 − 8tα2 − 10t2α + 5t3
(t− α) (7t+ α)
> 0
Deviation is less tempting for v > 3α also if σ = 0.
In this section, we have shown that our results are quite robust. Given that multi-
homing consumers are not negligible in the ad market, our results hold for all v > 3α. A
higher v does not make single-homing more attractive relative to multi-homing and it does
not reduce the incentives to deviate from single-homing. Moreover, a higher v makes it less
imperative to deviate from multi-homing. Evaluating v−values below 3α is less interesting
since the lower boundary is given by v = 2.75α.
Consumers
For a general v, we check whether consumers will subscribe to both platforms when p = pM
∗
.



















2v + α + 3ασ − 2t
2t+ α− 3ασ
.





i for v = 3α, the same is true for any other v-value as
well. 
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